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I.   Background: the banking crisis of 1995 
The Mexican banking crisis of 1995 contained many of the same characteristics as other banking 
crises: a massive expansion of credit in a short period of time, poor bank management, supervisory 
and regulatory loopholes, and a shock (both domestic and external). The perverse incentives created 
by a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime contributed to the onset of the crisis. However, the weakness of 
the financial system and loopholes within the regulatory and supervisory frameworks exacerbated its 
aftermath. The experience has provided important policy lessons. We divide the different factors that 
triggered the crisis and were responsible for its severity into the following categories: the 
macroeconomic environment, the incentives’ structure faced by economic agents, and the legal and 
regulatory framework. 
I.1  The macroeconomic environment 
Financial deregulation, the signing of NAFTA at the end of 1992, and the fact that inflation had 
achieved single digits during 1993 and 1994,
2 induced an impressive sum of capital inflows into the 
country. While in 1988 there was a net disinvestment of 2.6 percent of GDP, by 1993 Mexico’s capital 
inflows amounted to around 34 billion dollars, equivalent to 9.3 percent of GDP. About 84 percent of 
capital inflows entered in the form of portfolio investments, which made inflows more volatile and 
highly sensitive to macroeconomic variations. In fact, the predetermined exchange rate policy led 
speculators to foresee “one-sided bets”. 
Capital inflows produced a real exchange rate misalignment. At the same time, the economy was 
experiencing a consumption and investment boom in the non-tradables sector. The latter was reflected 
in an unsustainable current account deficit. Finally, an asset price bubble emerged which, in turn, 
attracted more short-term capital flows and the vicious cycle continued to feed on itself until it became 
unsustainable. The situation deteriorated further when the Federal Reserve decided to tighten its 
monetary policy and Mexico was subject to several political shocks. Domestic capital flight eventually 
drained the central bank’s foreign reserves completely, forcing the abandonment of the quasi-fixed 
exchange rate regime at the end of 1994. 
The collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994 resulted in a more than 100 percent devaluation 
of the exchange rate. As a result, inflation skyrocketed from one digit to more than 50 percent, and 
nominal interest rates reached almost 100 percent. The real economy plunged, real wages collapsed 
and unemployment increased. GDP fell more than 6 percent during 1995. Firms and households were 
overwhelmed by the increase in interest rates to levels hovering at around 100 percent, accelerating 
the rate of debt amortization. The concurrent decline of real income also raised the debt burden. 
Banks suffered on both sides of their balance sheets. On the asset side, the amount of non-performing 
loans increased sharply, especially those denominated in foreign exchange. On the liability side, 
depositors demanded higher interest rates to keep their money in banks. Moreover, many Mexican 
banks required assistance to honor their foreign currency obligations. 
                                                       
1   Deputy Governor, Banco de México. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Banco de México. 
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I.2  The incentive structure 
The crisis was preceded by a period of financial deregulation and abundant liquidity which led to a 
rapid surge in credit to the private sector. Banks did not take proper consideration of provisioning of 
credit risks. Domestic banks ended up with riskier loan portfolios, while low-risk firms had access to 
cheaper dollar financing from foreign banks. The increase in credit risk led to a rise in non-performing 
loans within the banking system. 
The unlimited deposit insurance scheme, which protected all banks’ liabilities without any restriction, 
induced moral hazard and increased the cost of banking resolution. Poor banking supervision, faulty 
accounting standards, the lack of proper credit controls and the absence of a risk management culture 
contributed to the severity of the banking crisis. 
Poor banking skills and conflicts of interest played an important role in the assessment and allocation 
of bank credit in the years that preceded the crisis. La Porta et al. (2003) analyzed the consequences 
that related lending had in the crises of 1994. Their conclusions reveal that: (1) related lending 
accounted for a large proportion of banking business; (2) once the crisis emerged, banks that would 
eventually go bankrupt tended to increase their holdings in related lending loans; (3) related loans had 
better terms than unrelated ones; (4) related loans had much higher default rates than unrelated ones; 
and (5) the worst loans were those given to individuals and firms with the closest links to the 
individuals who controlled the banks. These conclusions demonstrate that related lending was an 
important cause of banks’ fragility in 1994. In short, excessive credit expansion, poor bank 
management and an excessive related lending rate contributed significantly to the severity of the 
crisis. Interestingly, banks had demonstrated signs of weakness that were not recognized by the 
authorities in time. The drawbacks of financial authorities are explained in the next section. 
The lack of appropriate banking rules, combined with weak supervisory practices, prevented financial 
authorities from detecting the fragility of the banking system before the crisis. For example, prior to 
1994, the banks’ accounting policies were not in line with international standards. A clear example was 
the policy of recording as non-performing loans exclusively the amount of payments due for more than 
90 days, rather than the total amount of the outstanding loan. The ratio of past due loans to total loans 
had increased significantly before the crisis took place. However, this ratio underestimated the true 
figures due to faulty accounting standards. A related consequence was the lack of proper provisions 
for loan losses recognized by banks and, hence, the false perception of the existence of strong bank 
capital that could be used to confront eventualities. 
I.3  The legal and regulatory framework  
The Mexican banking crisis revealed the frailty not only of regulations, but also of the legal framework. 
Many loans were written off because of issues directly related to the inefficient judicial and regulatory 
procedures that involved the recovery of loans from bankrupted companies. The legal framework 
proved to favor debtors over creditors. Thus, it was not surprising to observe an excessive number of 
companies filing for bankruptcy, even when they were not in financial distress. Legal disputes were 
time consuming. In many cases, these processes took many years to be resolved. Moreover, creditors 
were required to take their claims to judicial instances as voluntary agreements between debtors and 
creditors were prohibited. Some analysts have suggested that the banking credit stagnation that 
persisted for several years after the crisis can be partially explained by the weakness of the legal and 
regulatory frameworks coupled with the lack of proper guarantees for creditors to mitigate their risks. 
Once the banking crisis erupted, financial authorities confronted significant legal barriers when it came 
time to intervene and take possession of ailing banks. The legal framework prevents financial 
authorities from taking actions without giving banks’ shareholders the right to a hearing. Banks’ 
shareholders could also seek protection from the courts to stop any supervisory measures against 
their interests. Therefore, the legal framework barred authorities from acting more expediently, and 
oftentimes forced them to negotiate the friendly takeover of troubled banks with shareholders.  
The next section describes the different measures taken by the government and Congress during the 
years that followed the Mexican banking crisis of 1995. An explanation is provided of the different laws 
and regulations that have been amended, as well as the ones enacted. BIS Papers No 28  279
 
II. The  reforms 
It should be pointed out that, in banking crises of the same magnitude as the Mexican one, authorities 
have to react to events as they take place. In other words, there is not much time for planning ahead. 
Leaving aside debtor programs, the aim of the majority of the reforms was to realign the incentives 
faced by creditors, debtors, shareholders, bank managers and financial authorities. 
The most important reforms can be classified as those geared towards: (1) stabilizing the economy; 
(2) realigning the incentives faced by debtors, creditors and authorities; and (3) strengthening the legal 
and regulatory framework. 
II.1   Stabilizing the economy 
A comprehensive macroeconomic stabilization program was implemented after the banking crisis. One 
of the goals of the program was to stabilize the economy in as quick and orderly a wayas possible. 
The policies and programs put in place allowed for a significant recovery of economic activity and 
inflation resumed its downward trend. It is clear that the two pillars for macroeconomic stability have 
been fiscal and monetary policy. Significant progress has been made in both areas in recent years. 
Such policies focused on maintaining sound public finances and abating inflation. In this setting, the 
importance of adopting a floating exchange rate regime must also be highlighted, since it has allowed 
the nominal exchange rate to adjust much faster to different shocks. This has also reduced the 
vulnerabilities of the Mexican economy. 
Fiscal policy 
The public sector deficit has narrowed considerably, from a double-digit percentage of GDP in the 
1980s to an expected figure close to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2005. Including other items that are usually 
excluded from the traditional fiscal accounts - such as PIDIREGAS, IPAB and FARAC liabilities - this 
broad definition of the public sector deficit is expected to be below 2.5 percent of GDP in 2005 
(Graphs 1 and 2). 
Graph 1 
Fiscal deficit 
Percentage of GDP 
Graph 2 
Public sector total 
debt































































































































* Estimated by Ministry of Finance in Criterios Generales de Política Económica 2006. 
1/    Data corresponds to the definition of broad net economic debt published by the Banco de México, which includes net 
liabilities from the federal government, institutions and enterprises, development banks and other public sector non-bank 
financial intermediaries. 
2/  Since 1994, the following contingent items were included in the definition of broad net economic debt: 
IPAB, FARAC, direct PIDIREGAS, debtor support programs and UDIs restructuring programs. 280  BIS Papers No 28
 
In particular, authorities have pursued the following goals: (1) improving the debt amortization 
schedule; (2) reducing financial costs; (3) minimizing the vulnerability of public finances to changes in 
interest rates and to exchange rate fluctuations; (4) relying more on local currency debt; and 
(5) mitigating any possible unexpected adverse effects of a sudden capital reversal. 
Appropriate management of public finances and the lower and sustainable levels of public 
indebtedness have enabled monetary policy to abate inflation. This has contributed to the 
development of domestic securities markets, allowing for the issuance of long-term fixed interest rate 
instruments (Table 1). This contrasts significantly with the structure of public debt observed in the late 
1990s, when debt instruments were mostly short term or indexed to short-term interest rates or 
inflation. These factors have allowed the federal government to rely less on external debt markets. 
Since 2001, the federal government has financed its fiscal deficit totally through the domestic market. 
In recent years this strategy has been enhanced, and public sector foreign debt has been reduced 
considerably. In particular, federal government external debt decreased from 19.3 percent of GDP in 
1998 to 9.4 percent in 2005. 
 
Table 1 
First issuance of fixed interest rate bonds 
  3 years  5 years  10 years  20 years 
Date  Jan 2000  May 2000  Jul 2001  Oct 2003 
 
Monetary policy 
The main goal of the Banco de México’s monetary policy was to regain public confidence and pursue 
price stability. Hence, the central bank made important efforts to improve its transparency, 
communication with the public and accountability. Among the most important elements of the Banco 
de México’s new policy was the publication of:  
•  The level of foreign reserves. 
•  Daily publication of the monetary base. 
•  The implementation of monetary policy under transparent measures that are based on a 
strategy of communicating the monetary authority’s targets, plans and decisions. 
•  The systematic assessment of the sources of inflationary pressures to evaluate the future 
path of inflation. 
•  The use of alternative measures of inflation, such as core inflation, to identify the medium-
term trend of inflation. 
Graph 3 
Inflation: observed and target, 1995-2005 
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Adoption of a floating exchange rate regime 
The Exchange Commission decided that from the end of 1994, the exchange rate would be 
determined freely by the market. A floating regime simplifies monetary policy management because it 
allows the exchange rate to adjust rapidly to domestic and external shocks, such as changes in 
international interest rates and in the terms of trade. Such conditions allow the economy to adjust to 
such shocks more easily. The floating regime makes it unlikely that the exchange rate will move 
considerably away from levels that are congruent with the country’s fundamental economic conditions. 
Moreover, it also discourages short-term foreign investments because investors no longer have a 
promise from the Central Bank to provide dollars if they want to get out of peso securities. 
The adoption of the floating exchange rate regime has allowed the exchange rate to adjust more 
rapidly to different shocks. As a result, real shocks are now absorbed by the economy more through 
nominal exchange rate movements and less through changes in inflation. This has led to a more 
efficient adjustment mechanism and to a reduction in the exchange rate pass-through to CPI inflation. 
The fact that the exchange rate may fluctuate in any direction reduces speculation in financial markets 
and helps to de-link price formation in the economy with high frequency movements in the exchange 
rate. In this sense, monetary policy has gradually become the nominal anchor of the economy. 
There is no doubt that the success of Mexico’s floating exchange rate regime has relied heavily on a 
deep and liquid foreign exchange rate market. Daily trading in the Mexican exchange rate market 
accounts for an average of 18.1 billion US dollars, both in the swap and spot markets (Graph 5). The 
gradual improvement in macroeconomic stability has allowed for a significant reduction in the volatility 
of the peso-dollar exchange rate, similar to that of the main currencies (Graph 6). 
Graph 5 
Peso/US dollar daily average volume 
traded in the OTC market 
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Graph 6 
Volatility implicit in peso/US dollar 
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*/ 20-day moving average. 
Development of derivatives markets 
One of the problems that became evident after the crisis was the lack of financial instruments and 
markets to allow participants to diversify and cover their risks. A first step towards promoting both, 
instruments and markets was the modification of the procedures to calculate market-reference interest 
rates in 1995. Hence, the so-called TIIE substituted the previous rate, known as the TIIP. The Mexican 
Derivatives Exchange (MexDer) began operations in 1998 as a self regulatory entity. The majority of 
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Increase in derivative instruments traded in exchanges (e.g. the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
MexDer) and OTC markets has favored the development of foreign exchange rate and debt markets, 
providing commercial banks and investors in general with a wide range of low-cost alternatives to 
manage their market risks; thus, the development of derivatives markets has completed financial 
markets and fostered efficient risk allocation through the economy. 
Development of long-term investors 
In 1996, pension fund legislation was enacted in order to regulate private savings for retirement. 
Pension fund managers (Afores) were created to invest money in these funds. These intermediaries 
are subject to strict regulation concerning their investment regime. Initially, they were only allowed to 
invest in government securities. Subsequently, Afores were allowed to invest in high-quality corporate 
and bank bonds as well as in structured securities linked to a securities exchange, but were protected 
from principal losses. During the same year, banks and brokerage houses were authorized to operate 
derivatives. More recently, other financial intermediaries, such as mutual and pension funds, were also 
given permission to operate these instruments. 
Increased transparency in primary and secondary securities trading 
In 1997 and 2001, improved auction rules for government securities were established to make the 
process more simple and transparent, as well as to enhance competition among participants. An 
electronic system to conduct primary auctions made the bidding process more efficient and enabled 
the central bank to process and publish the auction’s results faster, thus enabling insurance 
companies, mutual and pension funds to participate. The time span between the auctioning process 
and the announcement of results was reduced to 90 minutes. Even though the government has the 
right to reject bids at the primary auction, it has seldom exercised this right. The last time bid results 
were rejected was in early 1995 and then again in September 1998, at the height of the Russian crisis. 
The government announces its issuance program on a quarterly basis. This announcement lists the 
securities to be auctioned each week during the upcoming quarter, and the minimum amount offered 
by each type of security. To facilitate accurate price discovery
3 in trading debt securities, regulations 
were introduced in 1997 to oversee the establishment of voice and electronic inter-dealer brokers. 
These rules set up a framework for procedural requirements, trading models and safety protocols to 
ensure that these systems performed as they should. 
Measures to increase liquidity in secondary markets 
Price vendors were authorized in 1998, in accordance with international practices and to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest among financial institutions, which have to mark securities to market.  
The figure of primary dealer, or market-maker, was introduced in 2000. Its objective is to enhance the 
liquidity of fixed rate securities in secondary markets by making continuous bid-ask offers in exchange 
for certain privileges, such as bidding for additional securities at the auction’s average price results 
once they are known. Liquidity in short-term zero coupon bills (Cetes) and fixed-coupon bonds 
(Bonos) increased substantially after 2000. 
In order to promote mortgage credit and a secondary market for these products, banks were allowed 
to issue “certificados bursatiles bancarios” that contain similar characteristics of banking bonds. These 
securities can be issued directly by banks or through a trust and can be used in repo and security 
lending operations. Because it is important that pension funds adopt recent risk management trends 
and in order to promote a more diversified and secure portfolio, these intermediaries can operate 
derivatives and invest in foreign securities of up to 20 percent of their total assets. 
In 2005, repo rules were standardized for banks, broker houses, mutual funds and pension funds. The 
primary changes were: (1) banks, brokerage houses and pension funds are allowed to do reverse 
repos with foreign entities; (2) repos with private securities are allowed; (3) Some amendments to 
                                                       
3   Price discovery is the process of establishing a market price at which demand and supply for an item are matched. By 
bringing buyers and sellers together and making the process transparent, financial markets facilitate price discovery. IMF, 
2004, Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators, IMF, Washington DC, Appendix VII, Glossary. BIS Papers No 28  283
 
master agreements were implemented; and (4) financial participants are required to guarantee repo 
operations between themselves and with their institutional investor counterparties. Table 3 shows how 
repo operations have had a huge positive trend in recent years. 
In 2004, the Banco de México, as a financial agent of the federal government, published a new 
regulation that authorized “boot stripping” in some government securities (fixed rate bonds, “Bonos M” 
and inflation indexed bonds). This regulation allows coupons to be traded separately from principal as 
zero coupons. 
II.2   The realignment of incentives 
During the 1990s, banks encountered a series of perverse incentives that fostered both moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Full protection of depositors, poor information disclosure, the lack of 
proper credit information systems and underestimated capital requirements kept banks from self-
discipline and promoted a distorted and poorly assessed allocation of credit and the taking of 
excessive risk, which eventually led to a loan portfolio deterioration. The onset of the crisis underlined 
the importance of the creation of proper incentives that promote market discipline and mitigate moral 
hazard behavior. As a result, both legislative and supervisory authorities promoted a series of reforms 
and initiatives intended to realign such incentives.  
Limits to deposit protection insurance 
Prior to the reform of the deposit insurance program, the government provided full and implicit 
coverage to all types of bank liabilities. Deposit protection was reduced gradually in terms of both the 
amount and type of liabilities covered. In January 1999, the Law for the Protection of Bank Savings 
was enacted by Congress, which created a new governmental organization known as IPAB.
4 This law 
establishes an explicit deposit insurance scheme
5 and supports programs that seek to provide aid to 
banking institutions in financial distress.
6 The reform introduced a limited deposit coverage of 400,000 
Udis
7 (approximately 130,000 US dollars) per person, per institution. Deposit insurance is compulsory 
for all banks, with premiums paid in relation to the amount of each bank’s total liabilities.
8 
Information disclosure 
After the crisis, disclosure requirements were increased in order to enhance market discipline. In 2003, 
the CNBV (the National Banking and Securities Commission) issued a regulation
9 that standardized 
and regulated the dissemination of banks’ financial information. The new information disclosure 
requirements focus on changes to banks’ financial statements, derivatives, investments, financial 
performance ratios, loan portfolio ratings, capital ratios, net worth, VaR measures and internal control 
systems. 
Credit bureaus 
The literature that addresses the benefits of credit information systems, commonly known as credit 
bureaus, is relatively abundant. Credit bureaus prevent adverse selection problems and moral hazard 
behaviors that arise as a result of information asymmetries (Pagano et al., 1993). On one hand, 
creditors with access to historical information on debtors’ behavior can discriminate, diminishing the 
risk of adverse selection and, thus, pricing their loans at lower rates. This is important for debtors as 
well, since good debtors would not have to pay rates that incorporate the risks related to bad debtors’ 
                                                       
4   IPAB stands for Instituto de Protección al Ahorro Bancario (Bank Savings Protection Institute). 
5   Article 6. 
6   Article 28. 
7   UDIS are inflation indexed units of account. 
8   Banks must pay a premium of 4 per thousand on the outstanding amount of protected deposits. 
9   “Disposiciones de carácter general aplicables a la información financiera de las instituciones de crédito”, CNBV, June 2003. 284  BIS Papers No 28
 
behavior. On the other hand, debtors who have failed to honor their debts will have a negative record 
with the credit bureaus. This will have a dual impact, creating incentives to discipline debtors while at 
the same time contributing to the mitigation of the moral hazard problem. An additional argument in 
favor of credit bureaus is that they generate transparency for both creditors and debtors, since debtors 
can access their credit reports and certify their veracity. 
In Mexico, there are two public central registries for bank credit. One registry is held by the central 
bank and is known as SENICREB (National Banking Credit Information Service). Banks and other 
financial institutions, such as financial factoring companies and leasing companies, report all of their 
credit exposures to SENICREB on a monthly basis. However, only credits greater than 200,000 pesos 
are reported on an individual basis, whether the credit is granted to firms or individuals. The 
information required for each major borrower includes: the debtor’s identification, productive activity, 
tax identification number (known as RFC), geographical location, business activity, risk rating (from A 
to E according to the assessment performed by each of the three major ratings agencies), outstanding 
credit lines, the amount of each outstanding line (broken down by past due loans and performing debt) 
and, finally, the currency in which the loan was granted. Data received can be redistributed back to the 
reporting institutions upon request. Reporting institutions do not require authorization from the client to 
request information contained in SENICREB. 
The second public central registry for bank credit is managed by the CNBV and is known as R04. This 
registry receives information on commercial loans from banks and credit unions, although it will soon 
receive information from other financial institutions as well. The information contained in R04 is 
extensive and includes: credit line and number, accounting and legal classification, amount 
outstanding, date of origination and maturity, amortization schedule, currency, interest rate, unpaid 
accrued interests, refinanced and capitalized interests, restructuring, risk rating based on the CNBV’s 
methodology and provisions for losses, collateral or guarantees. The information is available to all 
supervisory authorities. 
Public credit registries are primarily used for research and statistical purposes by financial authorities, 
and do not contribute significantly to the selection of debtors by financial institutions. The fact that 
these registries do not provide credit bureau services has reduced the entry barriers for private credit 
registries. Two private credit registries have emerged since the banking crisis: Buró de Crédito and 
Círculo de Crédito. The former began operations in 1996 and compiles information on individuals and 
firms. The latter began to operate this year and only provides information on individuals. Access to 
information is restricted to those firms that share their databases with a credit bureau. However, 
consumers can access their own information free of charge once every year. Both of these companies 
are subject to the Law Regulating Credit Information Societies, last amended in 2004. The central 
bank has issued the General Rules for Operations and Activities of Credit Bureaus and Their Users, 
which provides a regulatory framework for activities carried out by this type of firm. 
Capital adequacy rules 
As of 2000, capital adequacy regulation has gradually been made stricter. The most important 
modification is the obligation for investments in financial subsidiaries and non-financial firms to be 
deducted from banks’ capital when they represent more than 15 percent of a firms’ equity. Deferred 
tax assets cannot exceed 20 percent of banks’ Tier 1 capital. Likewise, subordinated debentures or 
capital instruments cannot exceed 15 percent of Tier 1 capital. 
Recapitalization: eliminating limits to foreign ownership 
The new capitalization rules put an end to several facilities that were given to banks after the crisis. 
Banks’ shareholders were forced to put more resources into their banks. The size of the resources 
required convinced authorities of the need to relax the remaining restrictions on foreign ownership. 
Mexican banks were privatized during the early 1990s, but at that time no person was allowed to own 
more than 10 percent of ordinary shares (banks had to be widely held) and foreign participation was 
limited to 30 percent in any single commercial bank. In 1992, changes to the regulations allowed more 
foreign participation. In 1994, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), wholly-
owned subsidiaries were allowed, but were nonetheless limited to non-systemic banks. Their 
aggregate share in the banking system was also limited to 8 percent, and a time frame was 
established to gradually reduce these limits during the following six years. BIS Papers No 28  285
 
After the Mexican crisis, the need to recapitalize banks led authorities to ease restrictions; yet foreign 
majority ownership was not permitted for the three largest banks. In 1999, all foreign ownership 
restrictions were removed for banks established in countries with which Mexico had free trade 
agreements. Recently, the Banking Law was amended so that there are now no ownership restrictions 
whatsoever on either domestic or foreign individuals owning a bank, as long as they have 
authorization from the Ministry of Finance. In order to get this authorization, they must comply with 
certain requirements established by law. 
Accounting standards 
In 1997, accounting standards were reviewed and amended to bring them in line with international 
criteria. Among the most important changes were: securities’ classification in accordance with their 
acquisition purpose, marking to market all trading assets and the introduction of the concept of fair 
value. Another important amendment requires financial entities to register past due loans, considering 
both the loan’s capital and interest as non-performing. Previously, financial institutions could register 
matured installments exclusively as past due loans. 
Prudential regulation 
Minimal criteria for credit manuals and for credit files were established, which comprised approval 
process requirements such as the credit bureau check. Provision requirements were therefore raised, 
and parametric models to classify and grade the loan portfolio were introduced. Banks can classify 
their loan portfolio using their internal rating methodologies based on default probabilities, loss severity 
and collaterals. In addition, lending limits were made considerably stricter, including related lending, 
which was reduced from a limit equivalent to regulatory capital to 75 percent of Tier 1 capital. 
The most common approach to dealing with banks’ foreign currency liquidity in emerging markets is to 
establish minimum liquidity requirements related to the size and term structure of foreign liabilities. 
Setting minimum requirements has certain advantages for both supervisors, as it is relatively easy to 
set minimum ratios and supervise compliance, and credit institutions, as it is convenient to comply with 
fixed parameters. Before the 1995 crisis, Mexico had already introduced liquidity coefficients for 
foreign currency liabilities. The fixed coefficient approach implemented in Mexico is by no means the 
best way to address liquidity risk management. However, this regulation is regarded as a necessary 
first step towards the implementation of an up to date regulatory framework for risk management, and 
the development and dissemination of modern risk practices in banks. 
The goal of this regulation is to encourage banks to show prudent behavior in their foreign currency 
balance sheet, to compel them to maintain adequate liquid assets in foreign currency and to promote 
long-term financing in foreign currency. According to this regulation, foreign currency liabilities with 
less than 60 days left to maturity that have no corresponding assets of the same or shorter maturity 
must be matched entirely by high-quality liquid foreign currency denominated assets. Another 
regulation establishes that banks’ foreign currency open positions cannot exceed 15 percent of their 
capital. 
Corporate governance 
Corporate governance determines not only how corporate objectives are set, but also how decisions in 
financial institutions are aligned with the specific interests of shareholders, regulators and other 
stakeholders. This subject plays an important role in banks and is the subject of particular attention in 
Mexico, where bank ownership is highly concentrated. 
Corporate governance reforms in the Banking Law in 2001 had three main objectives: to improve 
shareholders’ access to relevant information, to define the characteristics and number of independent 
board members and to create audit committees composed of board members. Furthermore, in order to 
promote more accountability in the decision-making process of credit institutions, the supervisor 
requires the signatures of board members and senior management on financial statements. 
Creation of risk management units 
In terms of risk management, in order to be allowed to operate derivative instruments, banks have to 
comply with internationally recognized regulations, such as risk units, which operate under approved 286  BIS Papers No 28
 
board guidelines and with modern systems that allow operators to constantly check risk exposure 
limits in real time. Additionally, internal and external audits have to periodically verify banks’ 
compliance with these requirements. 
II.3  Strengthening the legal and regulatory framework 
Bankruptcy law and foreclosure procedures 
As mentioned above, prior to Mexico’s financial crisis, the legal framework did not provide the right 
incentives for debtors and creditors. Insolvency and foreclosure procedures were long and 
cumbersome. As a result, many laws were revised and reformed
10 to ensure secured creditors’ 
interests and foster credit development. The Bankruptcy Law
11 stands out as one of the laws that was 
subject to major changes. Zúñiga (2005) highlights the main differences between the new law and the 
previous one by pointing out that one crucial benefit of the bankruptcy law reform was that it 
established an independent institution called IFECOM
12 in charge of managing bankruptcy claims. 
This institution must have the proper technical knowledge to deal with different issues involving 
insolvency disputes and, thus, should respond in a more efficient manner. 
The setting of strict timelines among different stages of insolvency processes is another major 
advance. The pace at which insolvency claims are processed is essential to avoid the loss of value of 
the firm, since factors such as depreciation of assets and less careful management contribute to 
reduce such value, leading to a minor recovery from creditors. Zúñiga argues that resolution periods 
will be minimized not only because of the penalties that are established by law if judges do not honor 
the timelines established, but also thanks to the greater knowledge transfer ensured by this 
specialized institution. 
The Law of Credit Instruments and Operations
13 was also amended. The reforms were intended to 
promote more efficient ways to back loans, complementing the Bankruptcy Law. The Commerce Code 
was also reformed in order to establish non-judicial procedures to execute guarantees.
14 This 
procedure allows creditors and debtors to establish an agreement for the execution, and is effective if 
there is no controversy regarding: (1) the effectiveness of the credit; (2) the amount to be paid; or 
(3) the delivery of the property given as collateral. To initiate the process, the creditor must request the 
property. Once the creditor has possession of the property, he can then proceed to execute such 
collateral. In the event that the collateral cannot be assessed, the judicial procedure will have to be 
followed. 
Payment system reform 
In 2002, the Payment System Law
15 was enacted, in line with the “Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems” issued by the BIS.
16 Its main objectives are to promote efficient payment 
system operations and minimize systemic risk. This law ensures finality in all systemically important 
payment systems and gives legal certainty that the collateral submitted to the payment systems 
cannot be confiscated. In addition, it grants more power to the Banco de México to regulate, 
supervise, and implement adjustment programs to financial entities that are managing a systemically 
important payment system. 
                                                       
10    The Law of Commerce and the Law of Credit Institutions were amended on July 13th 2003 and June 13th 2003, 
respectively. 
11    The previous bankruptcy law, known as the “Ley de quiebras y suspensión de pagos” was replaced by the “Ley de 
concursos mercantiles,” which was published in the Diario Official (the Oficial Federation Newspaper) on May 12, 2000. 
12   IFECOM stands for Instituto Federal de Especialistas en Concursos Mercantiles, the Federal Institute of Specialists in 
Commercial Bankruptcy. 
13   Created on August 27, 1932 and last amended on July 13, 2003. 
14   This procedure is also known as an execution agreement. 
15   Diario Oficial de la Federación, December 12, 2002. 
16   Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, BIS, 2001. BIS Papers No 28  287
 
Other measures intended to promote financial stability are related to the means by which the Banco de 
México provides credit to ensure the proper operation of payment systems. Currently, central bank 
credit is concentrated in one payment system and high quality collaterals are required for all participants. 
Early warning and prompt corrective actions 
The Banking Law now sets out immediate actions to be undertaken by banks if their capital adequacy 
falls short of the required minimum capital ratio. Mandatory and discretionary measures are prescribed 
by supervisors according to different capital levels. For instance, when a bank’s capital ratio falls below 
8 percent, the supervisor, among other measures, must order the bank to submit a recapitalization plan 
and prohibit the payment of dividends. Additionally, the supervisor may restrict the expansion of its risk-
weighted assets or any other business that may further deteriorate the bank’s capital ratio. If the bank’s 
capital falls below 7 percent, the bank would automatically need supervisory approval to invest in non-
financial assets, to open new subsidiaries or to undertake new lines of business. Under this scenario, the 
supervisor can also appoint new managers, board members or external auditors. 
Finally, if a bank’s capital ratio falls below 4 percent, the supervisor must inform the Ministry of 
Finance, the central bank and the Deposit Insurance Agency of the bank’s situation in order for them 
to coordinate its resolution. At this point, the supervisor may order the bank to comply with any legally 
available corrective actions. 
III.  Evolution of Mexican banks 
As a result of the banking crisis of 1995, commercial banks’ balance sheet contracted significantly: 
total assets
17 as a share of GDP went from a historical high of almost 70 percent in 1994 to 34 percent 
in mid-2005 (Graph 7). Nonetheless, it has gradually started to recover. The crisis led to an important 
consolidation of the banking system. Foreign investment in the banking system has also grown 
considerably in recent years, from below 20 percent in 1997 to more than 80 percent in 2005. A large 
share of Mexican commercial banks is now part of global financial institutions, helping to improve risk 
management practices and diversifying part of the domestic risks at a global scale. 
If measured by total assets as a percentage of GDP, the size of the banking sector has been stable 
during the last five years. As a percentage of GDP, the Mexican banking system is small even in 
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1  Including repo operations. 
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Non-bank financial intermediaries have grown faster than banks, and banks’ share in the financial 
system’s total assets fell from 72 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2005. The fastest growing financial 
intermediaries are pension funds, non-bank banks and mutual funds, and only during and after 2003 
did commercial banks total assets start to show positive real rates of growth. A consequence of this is 
that financing to the private sector has diversified. Financing from commercial banks in 1995 was 
equivalent to 65 percent of total financing
18 to the private sector; in 2005, this figure decreased to 
30 percent. 
Since the 1995 crisis, financial sector reforms, thoroughly described above, have been gradually 
implemented. Under this new regulatory framework, and in a stable macroeconomic environment, 
commercial banks’ performance in Mexico has markedly improved. Especially since 2000, once the 
consolidation process after the crisis slowed down
19, banks have continuously enhanced their 
soundness and profitability indicators. The pretax return on shareholders’ funds has grown since 1998, 
from negative numbers to almost 30 percent in September 2005. 
 
Table 2 
Return on equity* 
  2000 2002 2003 2004  IIIQ 
2005 
Banking system  6.9%  10.0% 18.7% 22.0% 28.9% 
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Further, capital adequacy ratios are higher than five years ago and the composition of banks’ 
regulatory capital has significantly improved. The losses originated during the 1995 crisis severely 
                                                       
18   Total financing includes commercial and development bank credit, financing from abroad, suppliers’ credit, and credit from 
non-bank financial institutions. 
19   The Mexican banking system consolidation process is described in Marcos Yacamán, Competition and Consolidation in the 
Mexican Banking Industry, BIS, 2001. BIS Papers No 28  289
 
affected banks’ capital, which decreased in real terms for the following five years. During these years, 
the banking system went through a consolidation process that implied a series of mergers and 
acquisitions which, apart from causing a reduction in its size, set the basis for its recent profitable 
performance. 
In the last few years, banks’ solvency has been reinforced. On the one hand, improvements in their 
financial structure and balance sheets, in particular in their asset quality, together with injection of new 
capital and retention of increasing profits, has strengthened banks’ economic capital. On the other 
hand, regulatory limitations have been imposed to the inclusion of deferred taxes and of subordinated 
debentures in the definition of Tier 1 capital. 
After 2000, foreign banks’ participation increased, driven by BBVA’s merger with Bancomer, 
Santander’s purchase of Serfin, Citibank’s acquisition of Banamex and, more recently, the entry of 
HSBC into the retail banking sector by acquiring Bital. The entry of foreign banks contributed to the 
recapitalization process of the banking system. 
Bank activity and profitability 
The strong performance of banks’ profitability during the last five years is explained by several factors: 
(1) strategies implemented by banks to improve net interest income despite facing a contraction of 
interest rate spreads from 1998 to 2003 - after this period, rising rates of interest and spreads have 
benefited, especially retail banks; (2) higher income from fees and commissions; (3) improvement of 
the efficiency index measured as the ratio of operating expenses over income; and (4) decreasing 
requirements of loan loss provisions due to the improvement in the quality of loans. 
From 1998 until 2003, interest rate spreads in Mexico declined significantly. During this period, banks 
managed to sustain or even increase net interest income levels. Banks have improved their financial 
structure; to be precise, they are no longer financing non-earning assets with interest bearing 
liabilities. Additionally, the earning assets structure has improved with a growing share of high-yielding 
loans. At the same time, the cost of funding is much lower nowadays as banks hold a larger share of 
low cost deposits such as savings and checking accounts. 
Credit growth 
Credit granted to the private sector has recovered. The highest real rate of growth is that of consumer 
credit, which has been above 35 percent in real terms during the past four years. Next are mortgage 
loans which picked up more recently. Commercial credit has registered high real rates of growth 
during last year. 
Graph 9 
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Overall household debt
20 has been expanding strongly since 2002. About 61 percent of household bank 
credit is consumer debt, of which roughly half corresponds to credit card loans. The dynamic expansion 
of household financing has changed the structure of credit granted to the private sector (Graph 10).  
Graph 10 
Credit to the private sector 
Structure 
Source: CNBV


















































The new structure of credit to the private sector allowed banks to increase the level of interest income. 
While commercial credit offers a spread that varies from 1 to 5 percentage points above the inter-bank 
interest rate, depending on the size of the firm, banks can obtain a spread of 25 percentage points in 
loans through credit cards and approximately 6 points in mortgage loans, on average (Graph 11). 
Graph 11 
Interest rate spreads 


























Credit card (right scale)
 
                                                       
20   Debt with the financial sector; it includes: bank credit (credit card loans, mortgage loans, car financing and personal loans) 
and credit from non-bank financial intermediaries such as non-bank banks. BIS Papers No 28  291
 
The increasing amount of resources aimed to finance the private sector and the high yield of this type 
of credit have increased interest income and changed its structure, as the importance of interest 
generated from financing the public sector diminishes. In 1998, 41.3 percent of interest income was 
generated by financing the private sector, in 2005 this percentage was raised to 56.5 percent. 
However, the banking system risk exposure to household credit remains low as portfolio quality 
indicators are at sound levels (Graph 12). 
Graph 12 
Consumer credit trend 
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Low cost deposit base 
Banks have improved their deposits structure. Low cost deposits represent almost 42 percent of the 
total deposit base; this figure was 31 percent in 1998. The deposit structure has allowed banks to 
significantly reduce their total cost of funds. In 1998, total cost of funds was equivalent to 78 percent of 




  1998 2005 
  Amount Structure Amount Structure 
1998-2004  
Real rate of 
growth 
Low cost deposits  530,523  31.6% 874,561 41.8%  64.8% 
Money market  435,386  25.9% 228,146 10.9%  –47.6% 
Deposits by banks  78,932  4.7%  136,657  6.5%  73.1% 
Repos 298,324  17.8%  678,809  32.5%  127.5% 
Foreign currency 
deposits 337,203  20.1%  173,568 8.3% –48.5% 
Total 1,680,369  100.0%  2,091,741 100.0%  24.5% 
Sources: CNBV; and Banco de Mëxico. 
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Higher fees and commissions 
Although net interest income continues to be the main source of income, fees and commissions have 
been growing steadily, increasing their contribution in banks’ net income. Commissions and fees are 
increasing on two different fronts: by widening the scope of bank services with cost and their individual 
charge, and due to an increase in the volume of transactions. 
Graph 19 
Net interest income and 
















Improvement of the efficiency index 
Efficiency measured as the ratio of operating expenses to total income has improved significantly. In 
1998, this ratio was 87.7 percent and in September 2005 it decreased to 57.8 percent. Along with an 
improvement of income, in these years operating expenses decreased. In the reduction of operating 
expenses the contraction of the employment base plays an crucial role. Between 1998 and 2003, the 
employment base decreased 24 percent, by 32,700 employees. Consequently, in this same period 
wages expenses fell 16 percent in real terms. More than a thousand branches closed, thus expenses 
in rents dropped 42 percent in this period.  
Table 4 









RWA/assets ROA Assets/equity ROE  Efficiency 
index 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)=A  *B 
*C 
(E) (F)=D  *E  (G) 
1998 –18.6% 9.1%  57.3%  –1.0% 14.4  –14.1%  87.7% 
1999 –11.0%  10.4%  54.5%  –0.6% 13.7  –8.6%  82.9% 
2000 13.9%  10.3%  51.4%  0.7% 13.1  9.6%  74.6% 
2001 21.9%  10.5%  47.5%  1.1% 12.7  13.8%  69.2% 
2002 17.3%  11.1%  47.0%  0.9% 11.6  10.5%  71.0% 
2003 32.7%  10.2%  54.3%  1.8% 10.3  18.7%  69.8% 
2004 34.0%  10.7%  56.7%  2.1% 10.7  22.0%  62.5% 
2005
1 42.4%  10.8% 58.1%  2.7% 10.8  28.9%  57.5% 
1  January-September in annual terms. 
Efficiency index = operating expenses/(net interest income + commissions). BIS Papers No 28  293
 
Final considerations  
All the factors mentioned above help explain the increasing levels of banks profitability. Table 4 shows 
the ROE’s decomposition ratios. These ratios show how an increasing share of total income results in 
profits (column A), indicating that at present 42 cents of every peso earned turns into profit. Increasing 
profits are obtained without a rise in income as a proportion of risk weighted assets (column B) and 
neither of increasing risk weighted assets as a ratio of total assets (column C). The positive trend in ROE 
indicators could also be due to a reduction of equity levels, which is not the case, as shown in column 
(E), revealing that leverage indicators have improved. Efficiency measured as the ratio of operating costs 
to total income advances in line with profitability, showing evidence of improving management. 
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